frac trailerCo authors David Leonard and Austin Carlson

If you were able to keep your frac trailers from the clutches of your avaricious creditors during the past several unpleasant years, you could be in luck. Owners and lessors of frac trailers may be entitled to a refund for sales tax paid in connection with the purchase, lease, service, or repair of the trailers.

How did this happen?

This new guidance arises from an audit of FracCo (the company was anonymous) in which the Texas Comptroller imposed a tax bill of $9.3 million, plus $1.6 million in interest.  FracCo argued it was entitled to a credit because it had erroneously paid sales tax in connection with the purchase of the trailers.  The trailers consist of a radiator, engine, transmission, and pump, all mounted on a base trailer, and include fuel tanks and racks to carry high-pressure iron and discharge hoses.

FracCo purchased and/or leased its trailers from an affiliate—thereby creating a taxable event.  FracCo argued motor vehicle taxes applied to this transaction; the Comptroller disagreed and argued sales and use taxes applied because the frac trailers were not “motor vehicles”.

The ruling

An Administrative Law Judge decided in favor of FracCo. The frac trailer qualifies as a motor vehicle because it was designed to tow and carry property separate from itself—i.e., the high-pressure iron and discharge hoses.  See 34 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.08(a)(2).

What are the implications?

In a word, significant for some.  Texas imposes a general sales and use tax as well as a motor vehicle sales tax. Each has significantly different rules and applications.  The sales tax is applicable to purchases, leases, and repairs.  In contrast, the motor vehicle tax applies only to purchases, not to leases or repairs.

If you have paid sales and use tax on the lease or repair of a frac trailer, you may be entitled to a refund.

Read this and know what to do

To avail yourself of a refund in light of this ruling:

  • determine whether you have paid sales tax in connection with the purchase, lease, service, or labor of a frac trailer.  If so, then,
  • determine whether the frac trailer is constituted in the same or similar manner as FracCo’s. This is to insure it qualifies as a “motor vehicle” for tax purposes.

If sales tax was paid on a qualifying trailer, request a refund from the Comptroller as soon as possible.  To request a refund, a taxpayer must:

  • Submit a written claim detailing each reason for the refund;
  • Identify the time period during which the claimed overpayment was made; and
  • Submit the claim within the limitations period (generally four years from the due date).

In response, the Comptroller may request documentation, such as accounting data and sales paperwork. If the Comptroller denies the refund, the next step is to request a refund hearing within 30 days of the denial.

Can’t get enough of those girl singers

One you should know and one you probably don’t.

wolfEffective this past August 3, the EPA has new regulations for methane and volatile organic compound emissions from oil and gas operations  As you know, reducing methane emissions is a key component of the President‘s climate change agenda.

Why should I care?

Because if you own or operate an oil and gas production, processing, transmission or storage facility, you will be required to comply with the new rule by no later than June 3, 2017. Other than that, don’t worry, be happy, and continue to go about your daily business in blissful ignorance of the impending regulatory burden.

What does it mean?

More expenses for operators of the aforesaid facilities, more demand for good inspectors, more operations for the EPA to meddle in oversee, and a risk of fines for a substantial failure to comply, whether willfully or by inadvertence.

Last weekend I heard Keith Kottrill of Innovative Ventures present a synopsis of the new standards.

The summary is an attempt in 22 pages to capture the spirit and effect of the new rule. It was not prepared by a lawyer and is not intended as a legal analysis. It is the product of Keith and his colleagues who will be implementing and conducting the on-site testing required by the rule. It should be viewed, relatively speaking if you aren’t an engineer, as a good place to begin to understand the rules.

Highlights

  • Get familiar with the term “Quad Oa”, an informal reference to the new rule.
  • There are two main parts of the rule: Control devices or practices must reduce methane and VOC emissions from certain equipment by 95%, and fugitive emission leak detection and repair (LDAR) applies only to well sites and compressor stations.
  • The rule applies to “affected facilities”, specific types of equipment or facilities that are new, modified, or reconstructed after September 18, 2015. Beware, those terms have certain, definite meanings under the rule.
  •  There will be a reporting and paperwork burden.
  • Look forward to quarterly inspections of some midstream facilities.
  • Generally, repairs must be made within 60 days.
  • See pages 13 and 14 for the EPA’s estimated industry-wide costs of compliance, including projected economic benefits. Honk if you believe the costs will be far higher.
  • The rule is based partially on a model called the the “Social Cost of Methane”, and the “methane-related monetized climate benefits” of the rule. Honk twice if you believe those models are based more on ideology than on science.

Time will tell how this rule will work. Among other things, supporters and detractors alike will learn the true extent of methane leakage in our oil and gas infrastructure.

A musical interlude

Today, girl singers you might not have heard of:

 

buckwheatIn a case displaying the tactics of anti-fossil fuel advocates, Earthworks’ Oil & Gas Accountability Project v. New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission, a court rejected a challenge to the Commission’s amendment of the “Pit Rule”.  This post is not so much about the Pit Rule itself as it is the absence of legal and factual support for the appellant’s arguments. In case you’re interested, the rule governs pits, closed-loop systems, and below-grade tanks and sumps used in connection with oil and gas operations for the protection of fresh water, public health and the environment.

Lack of Authority? No

Claim:  The Commission had no authority to amend the rule because of a pending appeal of the original rule – the one being amended. No authority was cited.

Result: Earthworks conflated the Commission’s rule-making authority and its adjudicative authority, which was improper.

Arbitrary and Capricious? No

Claim:  The rulemaking was arbitrary and capricious.  To succeed on this claim, the opponent must prove that a rule was beyond the authority of Commission, was not in accordance with law, or was unreasonable and without a rational basis.

Result: The Commission had denied Earthworks’ request to take notice of certain of its prior records; Earthworks asked the court to take notice of records anyway, but again cited no authority to support the position.  The Commission elected not to respond to every concern raised by Earthworks. The Commission’s detailed summaries of its findings were satisfactory.

Economic development is a legitimate basis for a rule 

Claim: The Commission acted improperly by promulgating the rule in order to further economic development.

Result: The Commission acted within its statutory authority when it included economic considerations in its stated reasons for the rule. The Oil and Gas Act and the Commission’s regulations give due consideration to economic factors, and authorize the Commission to do whatever is reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.  Economic considerations cannot be the sole purpose for creating or amending a rule, but found no indication that economic considerations were the primary purpose behind the rule.  The Commission cited many reasons why the rule was necessary, including encouraging reuse and recycling of oilfield fluids and reducing surface impacts.

Cost-saving is a legitimate purpose for a rule

Claim: The order adopting the 2008 Rule stated that the Commission had made all changes it could to lessen potential effects on small businesses while still protecting fresh water, human health and the environment. Thus, it was argued, because all possible measures were taken in 2008 there could not be any more cost-saving measures to be made in 2013.

  • Result:  Denied; no factual basis was cited.

Inadequate notice? No

Claim: Public notice of the rule was inadequate.

Result: Again, no authority was cited.

Takeaways

  • Was this suit more to obstruct than obtain legal recourse?
  • Who funds these efforts?
  • What lawyer has the temerity to assert serial arguments citing no authority?

Stanley Dural a/k/a Buckwheat Zydeco RIP.

He did the zydeco

and the N.O R&B.

jackie robinsonMy blogging sensei Cordell Parvin says the title should always inform the reader of the content. Mea culpa on this one; I couldn’t resist the alliterations.

Some time back I reported on Carlton Energy Group et al v. Phillips et al.  See that entry for the facts and a Texas Supreme Court opinion. In this new opinion from the court of appeal, the trial court was vindicated and the rest of us learned more about determining fair market value and lost profits.

A brief history

The trial court awarded Carlton $31.16 million in actual damages after finding that Phillips and EurEnergy tortuously interfered with Carlton’s contract with CBM. The court of appeal reversed and rendered judgment for $66.5 million in actual damages. The Supreme Court suggested a remittitur to the $31.1 million, which Carlton accepted.

In this appeal Phillips reiterated without success that the evidence was factually insufficient and asked for remand to the trial court for a do-over. Lawyers: See the inside baseball analysis of legally and factually sufficient evidence.

Arriving at fair market value

Carlton’s damages focused on the fair market value of Carlton’s interest in the Bulgarian gas exploration project: What would a willing buyer pay a willing seller, neither acting under any compulsion?

FMV is generally determined by:

  • comparable market sales,
  • replacement costs less depreciation, or
  • capitalizing net income – that is, profits.

And lost profits 

The lost profits were not themselves sought as damages, but were used to determine the FMV of the project. The court had this to say about lost profits:

  • Profits can be recovered only when the amount is proved with reasonable certainty.
  • The reasonable certainty requirement is intended to be flexible enough to accommodate the myriad circumstances in which claims for lost profits arise.
  • It is impossible to announce with exact certainty any rule measuring profits, the loss for which the recovery may be had.
  • What constitutes reasonably certain evidence of lost profits is a fact-intensive determination.
  • At a minimum, opinions or estimates of lost profits must be based on objective facts, figures or data from which the amount of lost profits can be ascertained.
  • Uncertainty as to the fact of legal damages is fatal to recovery, but uncertainty as to the amount will not defeat recovery.

The damages were in great part determined by extrapolating from the Carlton/Philips agreement to the total value of the project. That the agreement was never consummated did not deprive it of evidentiary value. Having made an agreement for certain price, which determined the value, Phillips was pretty much stuck with that valuation.

Trial strategy and the suicide squeeze

An earlier post compared a defendant’s election not to offer his own damage evidence to the suicide squeeze. In this one – unlike Jackie Robinson – the defendant was out at the plate. Phillips presented no FMV evidence of his own, choosing rather to attack Carlton’s experts.

Gearing up, musically, for the World Series.

While we’re at it, … go ahead and squander just a teeny-bit more time and then back to work.

stratigraphic formation

Co-author Brooke Sizer

How many of your mineral conveyances are described like this:

… all of Sellers’ right, title and interest in and to (a) the oil, gas and other minerals in, to and under the lands … ONLY INSOFAR as such oil, gas and other minerals are located below that depth which is the stratigraphic equivalent of the base of the Cotton Valley formation and the top of the Louark Group defined as correlative to a depth of 10,765′ in the Winchester Samuels 23 # 1 well … and correlative to a depth of 9,298′ in the Tenneco Baker # 1 well …

The dispute

BRP’s predecessor, IP, sold mineral rights in 13,000 acres in DeSoto and Bienville Parishes to Chesapeake with just that description.  When BRP later went to sell more, Chesapeake claimed that the agreement conveyed rights to the Bossier Shale (lying above the Louark Group), as well as the Haynesville. BRP countered that only rights in the Haynesville Shale and lower depths were sold, thus BRP retained all interests above the top of the Louark Group. BRP LLC (Delaware) v. MC Louisiana Minerals LLC, et al. ensued.

The negotiations

The trial court could not ascertain the common intention of the parties in the IP assignment from the words of the assignment itself. So the court considered parol evidence. On one hand, the parties only talked about rights to the Haynesville Shale, and BRP believed that only the Haynesville was below the Cotton Valley formation. On the other, email from Chesapeake referenced its intent to buy all rights below the Cotton Valley.

Big fact:  No geologist was consulted about the description.

A formation is not a monument 

BRP argued that the rules governing surface limitations on servitudes apply to dividing mineral servitudes by depth. In determining the location of a boundary on the land the most important factor is natural monuments.  BRP urged that the “base of the Cotton Valley Formation” and the “top of the Louark Group” are natural monuments. That argument was unsuccessful.

Experts testified that subsurface formations do not have the permanence of natural monuments on the surface: “The location of formations and groups are subject to disagreement among geologists, and the general thought about their location can vary over time…., for this reason, stratigraphic markers, such as the well depths used in this case, are the more commonly used in the oil and gas industry.”

BRP’s problem was that the base of the Cotton Valley and the top of the Louark Group are two different boundaries and are separated by the 500 to 600 foot thick Bossier Shale.

The result

The trial court judgment in favor of Chesapeake was affirmed.

  • The stratigraphic markers represented by well depths were sufficient for designating the minerals conveyed. The depth limitation language was self-defining.
  • IP had been in a position to complete the due diligence necessary to protect its interests.

What does this case mean to you? 

  • If you talk geology, make sure your geologist is on the team.
  • IP’s dealmakers didn’t understand the geology of the formations.
  • Good try BRP, but as successor you were stuck with IP’s description, and their lack of knowledge.

The (almost) perfect musical interlude

Les was overheard last week crooning this mournful tune to his Tiger fanbase. Was it too soon?

Les urges the Tigers to read energyandthelaw.
Les urges the Tigers to read Energy and the Law.

Square Mile Energy LLC v. Pommier considered this language in a Louisiana partition agreement: “N.B: Included in this transfer are any and all mineral rights, when available, to Roxanne and all surface rights.” Did this language include an interest in a mineral servitude inherited by Paul as co-owner with his siblings?

To answer the question, a few facts are in order. Paul and his siblings inherited five tracts of land in Vermilion Parish. Paul and Roxanne acquired Tract 2 during their marriage, with Paul and the siblings reserving all minerals. Upon Paul and Roxanne’s divorce they executed the partition agreement, in which Roxanne was granted Tract 2.

Roxanne’s position

  • She and Paul owned Tract 2 as community property.
  • A fundamental rule of Louisiana law is that a conveyance of land carries with it all the incidents of ownership, including mineral rights, except such rights as may be expressly reserved.
  • The mineral rights were not expressly excepted in the transfer and therefore the agreement unambiguously transferred a portion of Paul’s mineral rights to Roxanne.

The court did not agree

  • “When available” rendered the clause ambiguous. Based on affidavits and the Judgment of Possession by which Paul and the siblings inherited the property, the court concluded that the parties did not intend to transfer ownership of Paul’s interest in the mineral servitude to Roxanne.
  • Paul was co-owner with his siblings and not the owner of the mineral servitude under Tract 2. Therefore, he could not have transferred the minerals.
  • The plain language of the document compelled the conclusion that the parties intended that the mineral rights would transfer to the owner of the surface after 10 years of nonuse.
  • The contract was a “Partition of Community Property”. The stated intent was to liquidate the community which formerly existed between them. Paul’s interest in the mineral rights was his separate property.
  • The agreement required Paul to transfer all of his right, title and interest in the tract. To interpret the document according to Roxanne would render the language in the N.B. clause superfluous.

Eventually, one of these days, at a time further in the future than Roxanne would like, after cessation of current production on the tract, plus 10 years of nonuse, Roxanne will get her ownership of the minerals.

And our musical interlude, appropriate for the season.

steam engineWhich of these statements makes sense to you:

A. “Never before have the rulers of a society intentionally driven it backwards to scarcer, more expensive, and less efficient energy.”

B. “Communism is the optimal system for avoiding dangerous global warming”.

C. “This is the first time in the history of mankind that we are setting ourselves the task of intentionally, within a defined period of time, to change the economic development model that has been reigning for at least 150 years, since the Industrial Revolution.”

D. “Giving society cheap, abundant energy would be the equivalent of giving an idiot child a machine gun.”

E .“Global warming, like Marxism, is a political theory of actions, demanding compliance with its rules.”

What the quiz says about you

B, C and D? Comrade, you took a wrong turn at “fueling” and failed to yield to “freedom”.

A and E? Then you should read Fueling Freedom: Exposing the Mad War on Energy by Kathleen Hartnett White and Stephen Moore.

If you want a real book review, go to the National Review. This post is more of a polemic, a defense of an honorable industry that is vital to the security and prosperity of the world (excluding Venezuela, of course).

Ms. White, Distinguished Fellow-in-Residence at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, spoke last week at TIPRO’s summer conference. See this PowerPoint for the high points of her presentation. It’s no substitute for the presentation itself, but if you want to know more you should read the book.

Facts that will impress your friends 

Here are compelling facts from the book that reveal the importance of fossil fuels to our modern way of life:

  • Human misery remained at about the same level for 100,000 years until the Industrial Revolution in the early 1800’s. Since then, misery has declined and millions have been lifted out of poverty and into the middle class. This progress is a result of human ingenuity and fossil fuels.
  • America produced three times as much food as it did a century ago, with one-third fewer man-hours, on one third fewer acres, and on and at one-third the cost. (Think, natural-gas based fertilizers, tractors, and other fruits of petroleum.)
  • In 1875 the average American family spent 74% of its income on food, clothing and shelter. In 1995 the same family spent 13% of its income on these fundamental necessities.
  • In cost per megawatt hour, oil and natural gas receive 64 cents, wind $56.29 and solar $775.64 in federal subsidies.

Some points might be overstated:

  • Haynesville and non-core Bakken operators might not agree that, “In many places fracking is profitable at $40 per barrel and in most places it is profitable at $50 per barrel.”

Now, for our musical interlude.

Sources for the quiz

A. Fueling Freedom, p. xv (no link, you gotta read the book).

B. IPCC chief Christina Figueres, Daily Caller, January 15, 2014.

C. Figueres, U N Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, February 3, 2015.

D. Paul Ehrlich.

E. Paul Johnson, The Nonsense of Global Warming, Forbes, September 8, 2008.

judgeGemini Insurance Company at al v.  Drilling Risk Management Inc construed control-of-well and redrill/extra-expense provisions in an insurance contract.

The question and the rule

The question was whether an insurance policy covered post-blowout expenses (see facts below), and whether each blowout constituted a separate “occurrence”? If so, there would be two deductibles. The rule is simple: An insurance policy is a contract of indemnity whose scope is limited to that expressly set forth in the agreement.

Gemini denied coverage under the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DRMI on the coverage and deductible issues. On appeal, the insurer’s denial of coverage was vindicated. Post-blowout casing and liner and associated expenses were required because of pre-existing hole conditions, not as a result of a well-control incident.

Rather than delve into the minutiae of the policy and the events, none of which would be helpful in your next insurance dispute, be reminded not to read too much into the meaning of one agreement. As with any contract, the meaning of an insurance agreement must be determined by the language of the agreement itself.

The facts

While drilling, DRMI encountered a kick in an unexpected high-pressure zone, resulting in uncontrolled subsurface flow. DRMI sidetracked the well, and encountered a second unexpected weak zone at a depth below the original blowout, resulting in a second underground blowout.

A second sidetrack was unsuccessful, never reaching the depth of the second blowout. DRMI drilled a third sidetrack and installed casing and a liner to isolate the zones that caused the second blowout. This one was drilled to total depth. DRMI sought coverage under the policy and a determination that there was one “occurance”.

Beware, home-town justice

Another issue is presented in this case, which was tried in Kendall County, Texas, in the 216th Court (County  Court at Law judge presiding). The plaintiff sued in its own county rather than the county of the defendant or the location of the events (Houston or Louisiana). After denying a motion to transfer venue, the trial court granted partial summary judgment, construing the contract in favor of the hometown plaintiff.  This put the defendants to trial with their case essentially gutted. The result was a $9 million+ judgment for plaintiff. The trial court got it wrong, ignoring testimony from hometown witness, DRMI president Alan Bloxsom, that undermined the company’s contentions.

To be sure, all trial courts don’t favor the homies. The other good news for the visiting team is that the appellate court can set it right. Full disclosure: Gemini drew my attention because I represented a party in the same court in a case with similar players, similar events, and a similar result.

Musical interlude

Yo, Republicans! Do you yearn for the Republican Party you used to know? The one that existed before the 2016 primaries, or during the time of the Bushes, or Reagan, or Ike, Rockefeller and Lincoln? Cookie and the Cupcakes share your pain.

pete fountainCo-author Michael Kelsheimer

Thinking about changing an employee policy in Texas? Kubala v. Supreme Production Services, Inc. says you can do it (almost) whenever you want. Want to make employees arbitrate their disputes? You can do that too.

Kubala’s employer Supreme announced a new policy requiring employees to arbitrate employment disputes, including Fair Labor Standards Act claims.  Continued employment was conditioned on acceptance of the agreement, which delegated to the arbitrator the power to make gateway determinations as to the arbitrability of any given claim.  Kubala did not sign that agreement after the meeting but continued his employment and accepted payment for his work.

The new policy was announced two days after Kubala had filed a FLSA collective action against Supreme but, as far as the court knew, before Supreme received notice of the suit.

The agreement to arbitrate

The first question was whether there was an agreement to arbitrate any set of claims, such as pre-existing disputes. Kubala’s obligation to arbitrate claims was imposed while he was already employed on an at-will basis.  Thus, the question:  Was there was a valid modification of the terms of his employment?

Arbitration agreements between employers and their employees are broadly enforceable in Texas. To demonstrate a modification of the terms of at-will employment, the proponent must demonstrate that the other party received notice of the change and accepted the change.

The court deemed that acceptance need not be more complicated than continuing to show up for work and accepting wages in return for work. Supreme satisfied this requirement by providing notice at a meeting where the policy was explained. Kubala knew the policy was a condition of continued employment.  He continued to work.  It doesn’t matter that he didn’t sign the agreement.

The delegation clause 

Was there was a valid delegation clause? Yes. The court was not opining on whether the agreement required that the merits of Kubala’s claim be arbitrated.  The only issue was who answers that question. The court concluded that it was plainly the right and responsibility of the arbitrator to determine his or her own jurisdiction.

Doubts

Judge Higginbotham’s cautionary concurring opinion addressed an employer’s ability to impose arbitration after the employee had filed suit. The result could be that the employer could coerce the plaintiff-employee into relinquishing his FLSA-given right to sue. Judge Higginbotham was concerned about “a regime of contracting out justice”.  Supreme’s saving grace was that it was unaware of Kubala’s suit until after the arbitration agreement became effective.

Worried about the presidential election?

Don’t be:

“Democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others that have been tried.”  Winston Churchill.

Be:

“The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.” Winston Churchill.

Remember the campaign ad about the 3:00 a.m. phone call? Let Gary Clark, Jr. answer it.

Great New Orleans musician Pete Fountain RIP.

unhappy partyLongoria v. ExxonMobil is like throwing a big party but failing to invite all the right guests.

The Longorias – 59 of them – sued producer-defendants over ownership of 9,200 acres in Brooks County, Texas, acquired in the 1800’s. Plaintiffs claimed their ownership was not recognized in subsequent conveyances and judgments and sought an accounting, damages for conversion of their share of production, to quiet title, and to declare their ownership in the mineral estate.

Trouble for the Longorias

Plaintiffs identified 82 absent interest owners as “Necessary, Nominal Parties” – let’s call them the “uninvited” – but did not join them as defendants. Facing motions to abate and to dismiss, Longoria claimed the uninviteds were not necessary because there was no claim against them. But their pleadings made claims on their interests. The court denied that argument.

Alternatives to joinder and service

Longoria offered to pay the unserved interest owners amounts equal to the royalty paid by the producers for as long as production continued.  Like a party favor for not even being invited. The court dismissed that rationale. If the plaintiffs won the suit the producers’ interests would be diminished. The “uninvited” wouldn’t be bound by the judgment, and could continue to look to the producers for payment of 100% of their royalty.

How long is long enough?

Longoria argued that they served 57 of 64 absent owners (producers argued it was fewer) and weren’t allowed sufficient time to locate and serve the others.  Observing that they had been given nine months to accomplish this task, the court concluded that the Longorias, having made half-hearted efforts at service, were not diligent in pursuing the unserved interest owners.

To understand this result, you need to know that this dispute is the progeny of a suit originally filed in 2004. In a 2008 opinion this same court dismissed that suit on the more or less same grounds as this one, but without prejudice, giving the Longorias another chance to assemble the proper guest list.  Looks like the court finally invoked a judicial curfew, sending everybody home.

Finally, Longoria asked the court to allow substituted service on the unserved defendants.  The denied the motion. It was late and was defective because it was not supported by an affidavit. Even new affidavits filed with a motion for new trial were insufficient because they stated conclusions with no supporting facts.

The takeaways

  • A suit is likely to be dismissed if all parties whose interests could be affected by a judgment are not before the court.
  • Left unsaid in the opinion is that if a party is deliberate in refusing to do what the court orders, the court’s patience will eventually run out, with unpleasant results. In this case, 12 years was enough.

A musical interlude, dedicated to the Longorias’ empty feeling as the producer-defendants and the court of appeal leave the party, hand in hand.