You would think that a Master Service Contract concerning boats and oilfield operations in the Gulf of Mexico would be governed by federal maritime law. In some situations you would be mistaken, says Offshore Oil Services, Inc. v. Island Operating Company, Inc.
The facts
Fieldwood and Island Operating entered into a MSC through which
The Texas Supreme Court in Roxo Energy Company, LLC v. Baxsto, LLC reinforced a fundamental contract principle: when fully integrated agreements plainly conflict with prior oral representations, reliance on those inconsistent prior oral statements is unjustifiable as a matter of law. In other words, a party to a contract cannot justifiably rely
In American Midstream (Alabama Intrastate), LLC v. Rainbow Energy Marketing Corporation, the Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court improperly inserted the words “scheduled” and “physical” into a contract. By blue‐penciling these terms, the trial court improperly altered the plain text of the contract. This opinion was issued on the
In Cromwell v. Anadarko E & P Onshore LLC the Supreme Court of Texas did what it so often does: In order to provide “legal certainty and predictability”, the Court considered the plain language of a contract in order to arrive at the parties’ intent.
At issue were habendum clauses in two oil and gas
Thought you’d heard the last of force majuere cases arising from Winter Storm Uri? Think again.
In Marathon Oil Company v. Koch Services LLC. the question was how to measure damages suffered by Koch for Marathon’s failure to deliver gas.
Under a Base Contract Marathon was obligated to deliver gas at the Bennington Hub.
Sewak v. Sutherland Energy Co. Ltd. is of interest for how the court defined terms commonly used in consulting contracts in the oil and gas industry, and how difficult it is to foresee all contingencies when negotiating a contract for services.
The agreement
Sewak agreed to provide geophysicist services to Sutherland Energy (SEC) in conjunction
The growling and barking presented by a claim for tortious interference is often far worse than the bite. Consider Segundo Navarro Drilling, Ltd. v. Chilton , which is a good example of that phenomenon in an oil and gas transaction. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendants, holding that:
In Steelhead Midstream Partners, LLC v. CL III Funding Holding Company, LLC, the Texas Supreme Court authorized a pipeline owner’s breach-of-contract claim—alleging a co-owner used foreclosure to avoid cost-sharing obligations under a joint operating agreement. The claim was not an impermissible collateral attack against a judgment allowing a foreclosure because the