In Cactus Water v. COG Operating, the Supreme Court affirmed that mineral lessee COG, not water rights owner Cactus (who derived it rights from the surface owner), has the right to possession, custody, control, and disposition of constituent water in liquid waste – so-called produced water – from its hydrocarbon production.
In Cromwell v. Anadarko E & P Onshore LLC the Supreme Court of Texas did what it so often does: In order to provide “legal certainty and predictability”, the Court considered the plain language of a contract in order to arrive at the parties’ intent.
At issue were habendum clauses in two oil and gas
WTX Fund, LLC v. Brown, is Texas mineral deed construction case.
In the same year as that crazy thing happened at Coogan’s Bluff, the Roaches executed a Mineral Conveyance to the Holts. Let’s review the transaction and ask ourselves why – or if – there had to be so many “intentions” clauses in addition to
The question for the Texas Supreme Court in Piranha Partners et al. v. Joe B. Neuhoff et al. was whether an assignment of an overriding royalty in minerals conveyed the override only in production from the identified well (the B #1-28), in production from any well drilled on the identified land (NW/4, Section 28)
Co-author Chance DeckerBNSF v. Chevron Midcontinent LP et al. asked whether a 1903 deed granted BNSF’s predecessor a strip of land in fee simple absolute or only an easement. The result: BNSF holds only an easement. There’s more to the case than an analysis of particular language in one sui generis contract. What else