Photo of Charles Sartain
Co-author Rusty Tucker

Devon Energy Prod. Co., et al. v. Sheppard, et al is your kind of case if you are in search of:

  • A roadmap for slicing and dicing royalty calculations in myriad ways,
  • Pretty good summaries of the Supreme Court’s notable decisions in Heritage Resources v. NationsBank, Judice v. Mewborne Oil, Chesapeake Exploration v. Hyder and Burlington Resources v. Texas Crude. (pp 12-19)
  • A description of the gas fractionation process.
  • For you scriveners: Reference to the Supreme Court’s lament for “the considerable time, money and heartache” expended due to the use of “industry jargon, outdated legalese, or tenuous assumptions about how judges will interpret industry jargon or outdated legalese”.

Continue Reading When is a “Gross Proceeds” Royalty not Paid on Gross Proceeds?

Co-author Rusty Tucker

In a suit to foreclose a property tax lien, if the taxing authority does not exercise due diligence to support service of citation by a method other than by personal service can the owners, as a matter of due process, raise that defect for the first time after expiration of the statute of limitations? Heidelberg v. DOH Oil Company says “no”.

Continue Reading Challenge to a Tax Sale Comes Too Late

Co-author Rusty Tucker

In Evans Resources, L.P., et al. v. Diamondback E&P, LLC, two agreements left the terms “constructed” and “utilized” undefined. If the terms had been defined would the outcome have been different? Maybe. Should parties define every term in an agreement? No, if they are content to rely on the ordinary meaning of the words.

The agreements

Continue Reading “Construction” of a Well Pad Requires More than a Survey

Last week’s discussion of the Pennsylvania Grand Jury’s report on alleged failures in enforcement of hydraulic fracturing is worthy of a follow-up. Here, combined into one document, is the Grand Jury’s report, the Department of Environmental Protection’s response (beginning on page 112) and the Department of Health’s response (beginning on page 165).

The Grand Jury recommends

Expand no drill zones, stop the “chemical cover-up”, regulate all pipelines, add up the air pollution sources, transport toxic waste more safely, deliver a real public health response, end the “revolving door”, and use the criminal laws.

The DEP responds

The report is unreliable, legally and factually inaccurate, not informed by applicable law or facts, relies on undocumented assertions, “does the public a disservice”, and the Attorney General failed to give the Grand Jurors accurate information.  This, from a Democratic governor.

The former Secretary defends the department

 A response from Michael Krancer, Secretary of the DEP from 2011 until 2013, says:

Continue Reading The Fracking Fracas, Part 2

There is “new news” and there is the same-old-same-old. Today is mostly the latter but it seems more “out there” than in it used to be.

The Pennsylvania Attorney General convened a grand jury that slammed regulatory failures in Pennsylvania gas drilling and recommended setbacks that would effectively destroy the ability to develop shale resources. 

In combined cases featuring California cities of San Francisco, Oakland and San Mateo and several California counties and public officials against Exxon Mobil Corporation, Texas’ Fort Worth Court of Appeal denied Exxon Mobil’s request for pre-suit discovery to evaluate potential claims for constitutional violations, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy.

No personal jurisdiction

Exxon Mobil

Co-author Rusty Tucker

Estate of Trickett was a dispute over heirship of Claralyn Trickett, possibly the wife of Robert Bowerman (who must have forgotten to divorce his previous wife).

The descendents of Claralyn brought a quiet title action and an heirship proceeding against the heirs of Robert, who claimed an interest in his estate by virtue of his marriage to Claralyn. The trial court abated the quiet title suit while the parties fought over Claralyn’s heirship,

The result

The court agreed with the descendents of Robert that the general four year statute of limitations applied and that Claralyn’s heirs’ cause of action began to accrue in 1972 when she died. The claim was barred by limitations because they did not file suit until 2015, 42 years after she died and 38 years too late.

This was not an action to recover real property. If it were, the cause of action would not have been barred by limitations.  The real property issue was not presently before the court. The only requested relief was to have the court declare the identity of Claralyn’s heirs and the respective shares and interest of each in her estate.
Continue Reading Limitations Bars an Heirship Proceeding