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Charles Sartain

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Co-author Brittany Blakey

Texas lien law in some cases does not require the filing of a financing statement for priority perfection. However, as you might have learned in In re First River Energy, the Delaware Uniform Commercial Code did not recognize the priority of Texas producers’ unfiled, unperfected security interests in proceeds under Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 9.343. In contrast, Oklahoma Producers prevailed because the Oklahoma Lien Act in 2010 cured a defect still present in the Texas statute. Texas producers with a lien are subject to UCC choice-of-law, priority, and perfection of security interests rules.

Rep. Charlie Green introduced House Bill No. 3794 which, if passed, would replace Section 9.343 with the “Texas First Purchaser Lien Act.”
Continue Reading Texas Legislature to Consider Oil and Gas Lien Law Amendment

Co-author Rusty Tucker

As Humpty Dumpty would have said to Alice if he were Justice Dumpty of the Texas Supreme Court, the term means whatever the parties to an oil and gas lease say it means, neither more nor less. In Sundown Energy LP, et al. v. HJSA No. 3, Ltd. P’ship  the term “drilling operations” meant that activities other than spudding-in new wells were sufficient to satisfy a continuous operations clause.

The lease

In a lease in Ward County, 19,570 acres from the surface to the base of the Pennsylvanian formation were “Producing Areas”. The remainder covered all depths as to 10,880 acres plus depths in the Producing Areas below the Pennsylvanian. During the primary term, production in paying quantities from anywhere on the leased premises would maintain the entire lease. At the end of the primary term lessee Sundown was required to reassign its rights in each tract not then held by production unless Sundown was engaged in a “continuous drilling program.” The continuous drilling clause in Paragraph 7(b) read:

The obligation . . . to reassign tracts not held by production shall be delayed for so long as Lessee is engaged in a continuous drilling program on that part of the Leased Premises outside of the Producing Areas. The first such continuous development well shall be spudded-in on or before the sixth anniversary of the Effective Date, with no more than 120 days to elapse between completion or abandonment of operations on one well and commencement of drilling operations on the next ensuing well.

Sundown spudded-in three development wells prior to the end of the primary term and then spent over $40 million drilling 14 more wells from 2006 to 2015.
Continue Reading What are “Drilling Operations”?

Co-author Rusty Tucker

What is the standard of care imposed by the Model Form JOA on the well operator?  Crimson Exploration Op., Inc. v. BPX Op. Co. gives us the answer, and it is no surprise.

Background

Under a Model Form JOA, BPX as operator and Crimson and other non-operators drilled the McCarn A1H well. After a problem that prevented further drilling the parties agreed to plug and abandon the well.

BPX billed Crimson for its proportionate share of drilling expenses; Crimson refused to pay. In BPX’s suit to recover Crimson’s share of costs, Crimson asserted the affirmative defense of prior material breach by BPX’s failure to act as a prudent operator in drilling the well.  Crimson argued the standard of care was a “reasonably prudent operator” while BPX relied on the exculpatory clause in Art. V.A of the JOA that excused liability unless BPX acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Continue Reading Well Operator Protected by the Model Form JOA

Co-author Rusty Tucker

The Supreme Court of Texas has ruled that oil and gas leases under consideration in BlueStone Natural Resources II, LLC v. Walker Murray Randle, et al. did not permit deduction of postproduction costs from sales proceeds before royalties were computed, and a “free use” clause did not authorize the lessee to consume leasehold gas in off-lease operations without compensating the lessors.

The takeaway …

… at least that’s what they ruled in this cicumstance. The Court reiterated that regardless of a recitation here or an observation over yonder, it will not adjudicate the supremacy of one contract clause over another or one arbitrary rule of construction over another. Rather, it will construe each contract according to its terms.

The royalty clause
Continue Reading Texas Supreme Court Weighs in on Post-Production Costs

Co-author Rusty Tucker

Yesterday we discussed aspects of PPC Acquisition Co., LLC, et al. v. Delaware Basin Res., LLC, et al. Today we consider whether the retained-acreage clauses created a special limitation or a covenant and the relationship between the clauses and Field Rules in place at several different times. Did Field Rules establishing 640-acre units expand  acreage each lessee could retain? (The clauses are highlighted in the opinion and facts are in yesterday’s post.)

What’s the difference?
Continue Reading Texas Court Parses Three Retained-Acreage Clauses – Part 2

Co-author Rusty Tucker

PPC Acquisition Co., LLC, et al. v. Delaware Basin Res., LLC, et al. addressed retained acreage clauses in three separate oil and gas leases covering the same 640-acre tract in Reeves County, Texas.

Did the lessees hold acreage under the leases based on one producing well, the Colt #1 that was completed in 2003? OR, did the lessees’ failure to drill additional wells, re-classification of the well from gas to oil, and failure to timely file a RRC Form P-15 with a limited acreage designation terminate the leases for all or part of the acreage?

The facts
Continue Reading Texas Court Parses Three Retained-Acreage Clauses – Part 1

Co-author Rusty Tucker

In Susan Davis Van Dyke et al. v. The Navigator Group. et al., the Eastland court of appeals applied recent fixed-versus-floating NPRI principles to a double-fraction mineral interest reservation.

In a 1924 Deed Mulkey conveyed property to White and Tom and reserved “one-half of one-eighth of all minerals …”

Davis (heirs and assigns of Mulkey) claimed ownership of half of the minerals pursuant to the reservation. Navigator (heirs and assigns of White and Tom) claimed that Davis only owns 1/16th and that Navigator owns the rest. Ruling on dueling motions for summary judgment, the trial court agreed with Navigator and declared, among other things, that the Deed was unambiguous and that the Mulkeys reserved 1/16th of the minerals (1/2 of 1/8th) and conveyed 15/16ths to White and Tom.

Davis asserted claims under the estate misconception theory and the presumed grant doctrine and asserted estoppel defenses. This post can’t do justice to the court’s deep dive into these theories. See this long form summary for more detail.
Continue Reading Fixed-or-Floating NPRI Principles Applied to Texas Mineral Reservation

What could possibly go wrong when drill pipe and a delivery ticket are sent to a well location? Well …

The facts

In Knight Oil Tools v. Rippy Oil Company, Knight rented drill pipe to Rippy for an Eagle Ford well.  A delivery ticket represented that the pipe complied with API premium class standards. The pipe, marked with two white bands, was supposed to meet standards for API premium class pipe. Some of the pipe did not comply with the standards.

(The physical condition of used drill pipe is indicated by an industry-recognized system of colored bands, with each color representing a certain physical condition.)

The pipe broke in the hole because of what the parties agreed was fatigue. Rippy abandoned the well and an offset well was unsuccessful. Rippy sued Knight to recover damages for the lost well and Knight counterclaimed for unpaid invoices.

Partial summary judgment for the customer
Continue Reading Defective Drill Pipe+Delivery Ticket=Lawsuit