Co-author Max BrownIn the Estate of Terry Banta presents yet another purported Texas land transaction doomed because of disregard for the Statute of Frauds. Terry Banta and the Herriotts entered into an oral agreement for the Herriotts to purchase a piece of property from Banta. In an unfortunate turn of events for everyone, Banta
Co-author Brittany BlakeyIn re: Estate of Robert Scott Masters, Deceased reveals the price to be paid for failing to timely admit a will to probate or as a muniment of title.
Know this about Texas probate law
The Estates Code requires that a will be submitted for probate (or as a muniment of title)
Co-author Trevor LawhornSM Energy Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. considers a question frequently asked in Texas suits affecting title: When is a suit a trespass to try title action and not a declaratory judgment action?
The dispute
SM Energy and Union Pacific are parties to three oil and gas leases covering lands in
Co-author Carolina Cuppitelli*The question presented in Aaron v. Fisher et al: Did mineral deeds bestow separate property upon the grantees by gift, or did they convey a community property interest to the grantees and their spouses by sale for consideration?
Why was the question important? A gift is the grantee’s separate property; a
The question in litigation is usually “WHAT”: what happened, what contract was breached, what did someone do or fail to do, and so on. In Hughes v. CJM Resources, LP, the question was, “WHO” had the right to file the suit in the first place? The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. International Development Corporation resolved the question, In a 100 year old Pennsylvania deed is a “subject to” provision an exception to a grant or a warranty disclaimer?
The transactions:
The clauses
The “First Clause”: The conveyance was “subject to” the mineral interests “as fully as said minerals and mineral rights were excepted and reserved in [the 1894 deed].”
The “Second Clause”: The conveyance was “also subject to all the reservations, exceptions, covenants, and stipulations contained in [the 1894 deed] … and in the [1903 deed].”
More transactions
CPLC quitclaims the mineral rights, the minerals were resold multiple times, in 2000 International Development Corporation (IDC) purchases the property.
Who owns the mineral rights, IDC or Commonwealth?
Continue Reading The Meaning of “Subject To” in a Deed
Consider the power of a single word over the fortunes of the parties to a property deed. Such was the effect of the court’s ruling in Barrow Shaver Resources, LLC, et al v. NETX Acquisitions, LLC, et al.
In 1963, by the Stone Deed, Dawson and Hill conveyed a 181-acre tract in Cass County, Texas, to the Stones (John and Treba, not the Rollings). The granting clause described the land by metes and bounds, and continued, “There is likewise conveyed … 1/8th of the Oil, Gas and Other Minerals … .” The conveyance was subject to an oil and gas lease then existing. At the time of the suit, Barrow Shaver had an oil and gas lease from Dawson/Hill and NETX had a lease from Merritt (successor to the Stones).
The question and spoiler alert
Did Dawson/Hill convey 1/8th of the minerals or did they convey 100% of the minerals and attempt to reserve 7/8ths in themselves? Dawson and Hill conveyed 1/8th of the minerals (and the surface, of course).
The Court’s journey to the answer
Continue Reading Texas Court Decides What “Likewise” Means in a Conveyance
How many different meanings can parties attribute to a term in an oil and gas lease? Answer: As many as they want, but the court will only use one, says King Operating et al v. Double Eagle Andrews, LLC et al.
The facts
The Robisons own 50% of the minerals in Tract 1, and 100%
Here we go again, in Gary and Theresa Poenisch Family Ltd. P’Ship v. TMH Land Servs., Inc., learning that a purported Texas land transaction will not be enforced if the parties fail to comply with the Statute of Frauds.
Poenisch and TMH, among others, jointly owned an overriding royalty interest in the
Co-author Rusty TuckerRidgefield Permian, LLC, et al. v. Diamondback E & P LLC, et al. addresses the scope of a property interest foreclosed upon by a tax suit in Reeves County, Texas. In this post we will shortcut the complicated facts and discuss the takeaways. The rules are what you need.
Royalty interests that were subject to an oil and gas lease were foreclosed upon and sold by the sheriff. The lease then terminated. Both the purchaser of the foreclosed interest (Magnolia, LLC) and the assignee (the Trust) of the former royalty owner whose interest was foreclosed upon (Albert) claimed to own the possibility of reverter * (the POR) and granted oil and gas leases.
The point
The Supreme Court of Texas has held that a POR is not taxable. The POR was not included in the property interest that was the subject of the tax foreclosure. The foreclosed interest was a royalty interest under the Meriwether lease. The POR, owned by Albert, was not derived from, part of, or attached to the foreclosed royalty interest. Therefore, the tax lien did not attach to the POR.
Continue Reading Tax Foreclosure on Royalty Did Not Include Possibility of Reverter