Boren Descendants et al v. Fasken Oil and Ranch, LTD, offers something to talk about beyond interpretation of the fixed-or-floating NPRI question. At issue was this reservation, expressed as a double fraction, in a 1933 deed:, “an undivided … 1/4th of the usual … 1/8th royalty” from a conveyance of real property”.
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Co-author Rusty TuckerIn Susan Davis Van Dyke et al. v. The Navigator Group. et al., the Eastland court of appeals applied recent fixed-versus-floating NPRI principles to a double-fraction mineral interest reservation.
In a 1924 Deed Mulkey conveyed property to White and Tom and reserved “one-half of one-eighth of all minerals …”
Davis (heirs and assigns of Mulkey) claimed ownership of half of the minerals pursuant to the reservation. Navigator (heirs and assigns of White and Tom) claimed that Davis only owns 1/16th and that Navigator owns the rest. Ruling on dueling motions for summary judgment, the trial court agreed with Navigator and declared, among other things, that the Deed was unambiguous and that the Mulkeys reserved 1/16th of the minerals (1/2 of 1/8th) and conveyed 15/16ths to White and Tom.
Davis asserted claims under the estate misconception theory and the presumed grant doctrine and asserted estoppel defenses. This post can’t do justice to the court’s deep dive into these theories. See this long form summary for more detail.
Continue Reading Fixed-or-Floating NPRI Principles Applied to Texas Mineral Reservation
Did the lessor’s deposit of royalty checks for production from a pooled unit that she contends was improper ratify the improper pooling? In Strickhausen v. Petrohawk et al, a jury will have to sort out the answer. Her case will be aided by exculpatory language in her oil and gas lease and her complaints from the beginning that her lease was improperly pooled.
The “Future Documents” clause and other facts
Strickhausen’s lease on 50 percent of the minerals on land in LaSalle County, Texas, prohibited pooling without her express written consent. An unusual “Future Documents” provision said (to paraphrase): If the lessee requires her to execute any document, such as a division order, such execution does not constitute waiver, acceptance, ratification, reviver, or adoption or waiver of any claim or demand, unless the document expressly states that as its purpose.
Continue Reading Lessor, Should You Cash That Royalty Check?