White Star Energy Inc. v. Ridgefield Permian Minerals, LLC is yet another title dispute reiterating that buying minerals that were once the subject of a tax suit foreclosure is fraught with uncertainty regardless of who you buy from.
Anne Mounts Bradford owned minerals in Reagan County. Apparently abandoning the dream of mailbox money without having to actually work, she failed to pay her property taxes.
In 1999 the taxing authorities sued her along with many other owners in a single suit, effected service solely by posting, and obtained a default judgment. At that time the tax rolls showed an address for her. White Star purchased Ms. Bradford’s foreclosed interests by a sheriff’s deed in 1999. In 2021 Ridgefield purchased Ms. Bradford’s remaining interests, if any, from her heirs.
Ridgefield sued contending:
- It had superior title because the tax suit judgment was void; her due process rights were violated because service by posting was not sufficient notice; and
- No Tax Code requirements apply to claims because the judgment was void.
White Star responded:
- Ridgefield lacked standing to assert that Bradford’s due process rights were violated; and
- Ridgefield was barred under several provisions of the Tax Code, including the one-year statute of limitations in §33.54a.
Due diligence in a tax suit
Ridgefield did not dispute that it filed suit more than 20 years after White Star’s acquisition. Rather, it argued that to prevail on its trespass to try title claim White Star had to first make a prima facie showing of good title from a common source (Bradford) to shift the burden to Ridgefield to show that it had superior title. Ridgefield maintained that White Star could not carry its burden of proof by invoking the statute of limitations.
In reversing summary judgment in favor of Ridgfield, the appellate court referred to Gill v. Hill, a 2024 Texas Supreme Court decision rendered after the trial court’s judgment holding that citation by publication or posting violates due process when the address of a known defendant is readily ascertainable from public records and there is evidence that the former property owner could have been reached and notified of the foreclosure suit. In this case, Ridgefield failed to present particularized evidence that Bradford could have been reached and notified at her address. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether Bradford’s due process rights were violated.
Gill held that the appropriate level of diligence needed to satisfy due process is an individualized inquiry. If the evidence shows that the Bradford was nowhere to be found after diligent inquiry, alternative service by posting may have sufficed.
Who had the burden of proof?
Ridgefield claimed that it was White Star’s burden to prove superior title as a matter of law. However, as non-movant on White Star’s summary judgment motion, Ridgefield carried the burden of proof to show that limitations did not apply before the court could consider the limitations defense.
The result
The trial court should not have denied White Star’s motion for summary judgment based on its limitations affirmative defense and should have denied Ridgefield’s motion.
The court vacated the trial court judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. It did not reverse and render because the interests of justice required the trial court to have a second look at the law and evidence.
Justice Palafox promised a dissent but has not released it.
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Sierra Hull … again, its worth it