The Collins mineral lease covers 1131.5 acres in Bienville Parish spread across 10 semi-contiguous tracts.
The lease
Provision 6 of the form lease provides: In the event of cessation of production for any cause following expiration of the primary term, the lessee would be entitled to continue the lease in force by restoring production
Alas, we might never know. Opiela v. Railroad Commission of Texas and Magnolia Oil & Gas Operating, was a challenge to the Commission’s authority to issue permits for allocation wells and wells drilled under Production Sharing Agreements. The parties have submitted a Joint Unopposed Motion For Reversal and Remand Pursuant to the Parties’ Settlement
The question in Self v, BPX Operating Company is how to balance the Louisiana Civil Code Art 2292 principle of negotiorum gestio against Louisiana’s conservation statutes.
When a tract of land is subject to a unit formed under La. R.S. 30:9(B) and 30:10(A(1) and the tract is not subject to a lease, the unit
The question with wide-ranging implications for Louisiana operators and mineral owners in Johnson et al. v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP et al is whether unleased mineral owners in a drilling unit established by the Commissioner of Conservation must bear their proportionate share of post-production costs.
The statutory scheme
Under Louisiana’s forced pooling statutes, the Commissioner may form drilling units and appoint an operator to drill and operate wells for all owners in the unit. Unleased mineral owners (the court called them UMO’s) are exempt from the statutory 200% risk charge for drilling costs applied to non-participating lessees. The operator is required by La. R.S 30:10(A)(3) to pay a UMO who has not elected to market his share of production the tract’s pro rata share of proceeds from the sale of hydrocarbons.
The claims and defenses
Continue Reading Louisiana Unit Operators May Deduct Post-Production Costs from Unleased Mineral Owners
Author Ethan WoodLouisiana’s compulsory pooling scheme seeks to balance the interests of individual landowners and oil and gas operators to promote responsible development of natural resources. Because of compulsory pooling, operators are not held hostage by individual landowners who refuse to lease, but landowners are afforded protections so as not to be taken for
If you’ve ever tried to escape penalties for the operator/producer’s failure to comply with La. R.S §30:103.1 and §103.2, take comfort in XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Company. You are not alone. No excuse has satisfied the courts, and there is none here.
The statutes (links above) require information
Texas’s proposed Oil and Gas Majority Rights Protection Act(House Bill 100) has many detractors whose reasons are intense and varied. Here are some of them:
It’s About Liberty
It’s my property that I’ve worked for years to develop (or not, but that’s my concern and not yours). I should be able
There are plenty of reasons why compulsory unitization is good for Texas, say the proponents of Texas House Bill 100, the Oil and Gas Majority Rights Protection Act.
More production = more money
The foremost benefit of fieldwide unitization is enhanced production. Oil and or gas that would otherwise be left
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet”. (This situation is more like the star-crossed lovers of this famous passage than you might think; let’s hope this session’s Act III doesn’t end the same way.)
We’ve been called to task because of